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The capacity to collect, disseminate and interpret information about an armed conflict has always been a key determinant of the outcome of wars and the sustainability of post-con-flict political order. However, globalization and technological change have forced all actors in the international system to develop ever more sophisticated interventions in a global ‘semiotic economy’, in which ‘language, text and discourse become the principal modes of social relations, civic and political life, economic behaviour and activity’ (Luke , 98). These discursive practices seek to fix contested meanings of concepts such as ‘peace’ and ‘conflict’ in ways that accord with broader discourses that circulate within societies and in transnational spaces. However, despite the salience of the concept of discourse—and the widespread use of the term in discussions of liberal peacebuilding— the rich literature on discourse and discourse analysis has seldom been deployed in the debate over liberal peace. In this article, I argue that the explicit or implicit reliance of many critics of liberal peace on a Foucauldian framework of discourse and knowledge is undermining the capacity to conceptualize and engage with the challenges of peace and conflict in a rapidly changing international order.

A contested international system and the passing of the ‘unipolar moment’ has posed a major challenge to the discourse and practices of liberal peacebuilding. Liberal norms underpinning an international regime of conflict resolution and peace-building have been fundamentally challenged in a series of recent conflicts, including state-centric counterinsurgencies in Chechnya, Sri Lanka and Syria. However, shifting geopolitics also forces critics of liberal peace to rethink their own theoretical frame-works. In particular, research influenced by a Foucauldian theoretical framework tends to occlude important aspects of contemporary conflict that reflect an emerging global order. As a result, emerging counter-discourses of peace and conflict are under-researched. In particular, a discourse of ‘illiberal’ or ‘authoritarian peace’— evident in the norms and practices of assertive states such as Russia and China—has gained partial international legitimacy while remaining under-theorized and poorly understood. In this article, I explore the direct and indirect influence of Foucauldian the-ories of discourse and knowledge on the liberal peace debate, before pointing to three major theoretical problems: firstly, a misleading framing of the local as the source of an emancipatory resistance; secondly, the exclusion of the role of the state in conflict; and thirdly, the occlusion of alternative discourses of conflict management. Finally, I highlight the concept of ‘authoritarian’ or ‘illiberal’ peace to demonstrate how discourses of liberal peace are increasingly challenged and contested in a rapidly changing inter-national system.

Liberal peace and knowledge production

New approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, which emerged in the after-math of the Cold War in the early 1990s, emphasized political and economic liberalization as primary mechanisms to resolve civil wars, implemented with the support of inter-national organizations, activist Western states and transnational civil society. These new norms and practices were accompanied by an unprecedented project of knowledge production about armed conflict, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Western governments and international organizations invested heavily in information and data-gathering about internal conflicts. Development organizations incorporated conflict analysis tools and impact assessments into project planning. New non-governmental think tanks, such as International Alert, Saferworld and the International Crisis Group (ICG), published detailed research reports on conflicts, arguing that better reporting and analysis would help to prevent future conflicts. Transnational advocacy networks brought ‘new ideas, norms and discourses into policy debates, and serve[d] as sources of information and testimony’ (Keck and Sikkink , 3). Attempts to improve the effectiveness of peace-building interventions repeatedly emphasized the need for more and better information about events on the ground and improved analysis in order to address the world’s armed conflicts more effectively. This apparatus of information gathering certainly added to policymakers’ understanding of complex and deep-seated conflicts around the world, but its impact on how policy was conceived and implemented was less clear.
Officials and researchers working in regions experiencing armed conflict often encoun-tered a problematic relationship between knowledge production and peacebuilding inter-ventions (Wimpelmann ; Waldman ; Autesserre ; Distler ). In a study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Autesserre demonstrated how international experts employed external templates and models that skewed data and analysis to fit generic understandings of conflict. Officials and diplomats often followed ‘dominant narratives’ that oversimplified the conflict and resulted in inappropriate policy responses. Local knowledge and specialized contributions by area studies experts were marginalized in favour of analysis based on misleading cross-national research or ‘thematic knowledge’ (Autesserre ). A study of British external interventions in civil wars offered further examples of such skewed relationships between knowledge and policymaking, conclud-ing that rather than knowledge informing policy, ‘research is often sought selectively and subsequently retrofitted to predetermined or pre-existing programmes’ (Waldman , 151). Research on Afghanistan concluded that even where external actors sought local knowledge, it was often reinterpreted and applied in ways that reinforced essentialist understandings of local social and political realities (Wimpelmann ). In Kosovo, the views of German police officers embedded in the EULEX mission also reflected essentia-lized views of Kosovo Albanian culture, norms and behaviours gained primarily from a process of informal socialization by more experienced expatriate officials in the country, rather than formal training processes based on research and evidence (Distler ).

These scholars question the idea that independent research, data gathering and analysis can challenge official power structures and induce change. Even where alternative information and knowledge is available to international civil servants, it does not always have an impact on policy. A study of interventions in Kosovo uses Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to explain why international civil servants promote the liberal peace despite their access to local knowledge that might challenge its premises. Powerful existing discur-sive structures constrain policy shifts: ‘Local conditions and local social fields are clearly subordinate to the dominant discourse of the liberal peace; hence, knowledge of local conditions does not translate into changes of the peacebuilders’ habitus’ (Goetze and Blie-semann de Guevara , 211). In an alternative formulation of this link between knowl-edge and power, knowledge producers such as the International Crisis Group are viewed as competing in a ‘knowledge market place’ (Bliesemann de Guevara ). However, in this political economy of knowledge, Western governments and agencies represent a monopsony. As a result, knowledge production conforms to a particular discourse that maintains the fundamental tenets of the liberal peace. In this way, ‘[w]orking for the inter-vention market, complexity tends to be reduced in a decidedly normative and pathologis-ing way’ (Koddenbrock , 674).

Liberal peace and Foucault

The ways in which knowledge appears to be closely intertwined with external interven-tions in civil wars has contributed to a view of the liberal peace as a Foucauldian discourse, in which power and knowledge are co-constitutive (Richmond , 26). Such a conceptualization of liberal peace as a unitary discourse that has disciplinary effects permeates an extensive critical literature (Duffield ; Richmond , , ; Grigat ; Howarth ; Jabri , ). For Richmond, ‘The liberal peace is a discourse, frame-work and structure, with a specific ontology and methodology’ (Richmond , 295); it forms a ‘hegemonic discourse’, to which it is ‘difficult to say “no”’ (Richmond , 669). Howarth points to ‘the hegemonic discourse of liberal peace, which aims to recon-struct and develop post-conflict societies’ (Howarth , 261). Jabri argues that ‘[t]he dis-course, from Bosnia to Kosovo to Iraq is one that aims to reconstruct societies and their government in accordance with a distinctly western liberal model the formative elements of which centre on open markets, human rights and the rule of law, and of democratic elections as the basis of legitimacy’ (Jabri , 124). Grigat follows a similar framework in an analysis of ‘the dominant liberal peace discourse, according to which peaceful societies are built by implementing democratic governance, introducing market economic structures and enforcing the rule of law, and are based on shared norms of valuing human rights, individualism, political pluralism and social diversity’ (Grigat , 565). Heather-shaw () suggested that liberal peace was better characterized as three distinct dis-courses—democratic peacebuilding, civil society and statebuilding—but the notion of a singular, unitary discourse has reappeared with regularity in critical arguments about liberal peacebuilding, with a broad consensus emerging around the notion that ‘an osten-sibly Western construction of peace has acquired hegemonic authority in the global sphere’ (Daley , 66).

Despite the wide usage of this concept of a ‘discourse’, there is little theoretical exploration of how discourse is understood, and only limited reference to an extensive lit-erature on discourse theory. Instead, discourse is generally used to reference the kind of unitary, monolithic discourse that emerges from an orthodox reading of Michel Foucault. In fact, Foucault’s usage of the term is notoriously slippery (Foucault ; Mills , 6), but subsequent research has tended to follow the definition of discourse as ‘a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—i.e. a way of representing—a par-ticular kind of knowledge about a topic’ (Hall , 291). A discourse ‘makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way’ and ‘limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed’ (Hall , 291). While Foucault’s understanding of discourse is not purely textual—discourses are ‘irreducible to the language and to speech’ (Foucault , 54)—language and text play a central role in providing a singular interpretation of events, defining what is sayable, what is considered ‘knowledge’ and what a given society characterizes as ‘truth’. Most significantly, discourse has disciplinary effects, defin-ing which voices are heard, who is marginalized and excluded, and which knowledges are downgraded or ignored.

The idea of liberal peace acting as a dominant discourse has been extremely influential in literature on peacebuilding, although scholars have not always explicitly invoked Fou-cault. The liberal peace acts as a discourse that interprets armed conflicts as driven by local ‘root causes’, which are articulated by rebels as social, economic and political grievances; these grievances must be addressed through policies of political, economic and social lib-eralization in order to resolve the conflict. The discourse provides language to label and name different actors in particular ways, whether as ‘conflict resolution and transform-ation experts’ (Richmond , 35) or as ‘spoilers’ (Stedman ; Nilsson and Kovacs ). A discourse of liberal peace offers specific meanings of key concepts such as ‘peace’, which become normalized within a Western-dominated order thus—as Kühn argues—‘rendering alternative forms of peace unthinkable’ (Kühn , 66). The domi-nant discourse excluded certain political positions as unacceptable—whether those of a new form of international trusteeship (Paris ) or conservative ideas that opposed intervention in wars, regardless of the level of violence (Luttwak )—and disciplined actors who spoke about peace and conflict in certain ways that were incompatible with liberal values. Critics argued that liberal peace tended to delegitimize knowledge that did not fit easily within its discursive framework, resulting in what Richmond terms ‘blind spots’, traced to the liberal peace’s ‘problem solving and epistemic frameworks’ (Richmond , 689). In addition, the discourse defined those who have the right to speak ‘by limiting and restricting authorities and experts to some groups, but not others, endorsing a certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizing and judging meaningless, impracticable, inadequate or otherwise disqualified’ (Milliken , 229).

Such an understanding of discourse as having disciplinary effects builds on Foucault’s most innovative theoretical conclusion—that the relationship between power, truth and knowledge is not one of antagonism, as in the liberal concept of ‘speaking truth to power’, but of co-constitution. ‘It is within discourse’, argues Foucault (, 100), ‘that power and knowledge are joined together.’ This relationship between power and knowl-edge is famously characterized as a regime of power/knowledge (Foucault ), in which ‘every particular form of social control rests on and makes possible a particular form of knowledge’ (Walzer , 64). The result of such a framework is that ‘there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations’ (Foucault , 27). Power is not constrained by knowledge; rather ‘the exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information’ (Foucault , 51).

This notion of a power/knowledge assemblage has informed recent research on epis-temic communities and think tanks in liberal peacebuilding (Chaulia ; Wimpelmann ; Grigat ; Hochmüller and Müller ). In a study of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Chaulia concludes that ‘USIP is a “knowledge apparatus” that subjugates knowledge from the peace movements about structural violence and iniquity in the inter-national order’ (Chaulia ). In a study of the International Crisis Group’s reporting on Indonesia, Grigat asserts that the ICG reproduces liberal peace through discursive prac-tices, arguing that:

Research and policy advice provided by think-tanks, in particular, next to providing knowledge on violent conflict, fulfil a didactic function in the liberal peace discourse. They generally promote a liberal governmentality, conceived by Foucault as a specific collusion of power and knowledge techniques visible in the totality of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections. (Grigat , 566–567)

In this view, far from offering knowledge that serves emancipatory ends—the prevention of conflict and the improvement of human security—‘ICG publications essentially aim to discursively discipline their audience through practices and procedures characteristic of liberal governance … thus perpetuating liberalism as the global “regime of power”’ (Grigat , 565). Grigat concludes that ‘[t]he contribution of academic and policy-oriented literature to the (re)production of the liberal peace project should not be underrated’ (Grigat , 566), mirroring a similar conclusion by Manokha on the role of academic research and advocacy in the field of human rights (Manokha ). It is not only think tanks and NGOs that can be said to reproduce a dominant liberal discourse and its accompanying practices: the essential tenets and theoretical biases of the liberal peace are deeply embedded in the language of international organizations, development bodies and government agencies, producing frameworks of meaning for officials and policy-makers confronted with the challenge of managing international conflict. As Kühn (, 399) concludes, ‘[Western states’] mode of knowledge production dominates the epistemic “software” of global institutions concerned with peace’.

Much of this work is informed by a reading of Foucault’s work on knowledge, although not all works discussed above use Foucault explicitly. Foucault delineates a kind of framing knowledge (savoir), which is intimately linked to power and enables the more superficial, ‘surface’ knowledge of connaissance to make sense (Hacking , 30; Rouse , 113). A further distinction made by Foucault—although much less theoretically developed—is between the knowledge that is inextricably bound up with power and what Foucault terms ‘subjugated knowledges’, meaning those knowledges which are essentially defined by their marginalization by the discourse, and by their distance or separation from power (Foucault , ; Jackson ). Foucault outlines two types of subju-gated knowledge: firstly, knowledge that is ‘historically subjugated’, erudite knowledge that is excluded by the disciplinary effects of unitary discourses; and, secondly, ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborate: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity’ (Foucault , 82). This represents ‘a particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it’ (Fou-cault , 82). In this way, Foucault recognizes a ‘hierarchization of knowledges’ that results in ‘[t]he disqualification of low-ranking, local, and popular forms of knowledge (“le savoir des gens”)’ (Smart , 164). Through his critical work, Foucault aims to ‘reveal and thereby help reactivate the various forms of subjugated knowledge and local criticism’ (Smart , 167). Foucault goes on to call for an ‘insurrection of knowl-edges’ against discourses as the most potent path to emancipatory effects (, 84; 2003, 7).

A ‘local turn’ in the peacebuilding literature owes much to this Foucauldian under-standing of power, knowledge and discourse (Hughes, Öjendal, and Schierenbeck , 820). A shift towards the local was part of a broader move away from studying the ‘linear’ politics of international intervention to a focus on ‘non-linearity’, the messy infra-politics of the everyday, characterized by hybridity, resistance and subaltern voices (Chandler ). The local turn reflected concerns that liberal policies prioritized ‘Western/Northern concerns and priorities’ and downplayed ‘local participation, owner-ship, identity, norms, and historical systems of power, social organisation and peacemak-ing’ (Richmond and Mac Ginty , 178). The local turn has an explicit normative bent: it asserts the local and the everyday as the essential components of ‘a sustainable, emanci-patory, and empathetic form of peace’ (Richmond , 47). Rather than being a ‘zone of disorder’ threatening a core of liberal states (Dillon and Reid ; Duffield ), the local turn suggests that the periphery might rather be the location of emancipatory knowledge and practice that could challenge structures of international inequality and conflict.
This mapping of liberal peace as a discursive formation of power/knowledge, a unitary discourse struggling with local—potentially emancipatory—knowledges, has been pro-ductive in its critique of often unspoken liberal theories and practices in the post-Cold War era. It has also offered critics of liberal peacebuilding an extensive Foucauldian meth-odology, particularly the methods of ‘archaeology’ and ‘genealogy’—the analysis of dis-courses in ways that expose their historical contingency and deny their normalization as universal, timeless truths (Foucault , ). Genealogy, according to Foucault, is ‘a sort of attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges, to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scien-tific theoretical discourse’ (Foucault , 10). Richmond’s () monograph on post-liberal peace opens with a citation of Foucault’s definition of genealogy: ‘Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allow us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tac-tically today’. Much work in the field, explicitly or not, continues to pursue a similar meth-odology, seeking to ‘entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects’ (Foucault , 83).

The myopia of the Foucauldian gaze

This Foucauldian framework of discourse and knowledge informs a broad critical literature on the liberal peace, yet it remains under-developed theoretically and its fundamental assumptions and implications are reproduced largely without question. Despite a rich litera-ture of post-Foucauldian discourse theory, other approaches to discourse in social theory are notably absent from work on liberal peacebuilding. In the following sections, I explore three significant problems with the Foucauldian analytical gaze. To a certain extent, these critiques build on existing critical literature on Foucauldian theory in Inter-national Relations, (see Kiersey and Stokes, ) but they have particular resonance in the field of peace and conflict, where the debate around the nature and impact of the liberal peace has reached an intellectual impasse (Paris ; Zaum ; Heathershaw ; Mac Ginty and Richmond ).

Firstly, the categorization of knowledge as either imbricated with power and discourse, or ‘subjugated’, and therefore capable of acting as the foundation of an emancipatory resistance, is both misleading in its portrayal of the everyday politics of conflict-affected countries and effectively denies agency to local people, in cases where their discursive practices do not correspond to ascribed roles within a project of emancipatory peace.





Thirdly, the characterization of liberal peace as a ‘unitary discourse’ discourages rec-ognition of any competing discourses. While Foucault develops a productive framework through which to critique a single dominant discourse, in a highly contested inter-national system a Foucauldian gaze leaves its own blind spots, concealing from view important new dynamics of power, agency and discursive practice in international relations. As a result, by the 2010s the liberal peace debate appeared increasingly divorced from ongoing conflicts and peacemaking in the real world. The critical litera-ture continued to focus on the archetypal liberal interventions of the 1990s—Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor or Kosovo—but had little to say about highly destructive wars where Western powers were not the primary actors, such as Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Ukraine or Syria.

Below I explore these three critiques and argue that post-Foucauldian discourse the-ories offer a more productive understanding of discourse and knowledge, characterizing discourses as always already contested, not simply through historical rupture, but through simultaneous competition between would-be hegemonic alternatives. I examine just one of these competing discourses, a discourse of ‘authoritarian’ or ‘illiberal’ peace, which offers perhaps the most influential idea of what a twenty-first-century post-liberal peace might look like.

Local knowledge and emancipation

The conceptualization of two types of knowledge—a knowledge that is intertwined with power contrasted with peripheral, local, ‘subjugated’ knowledge—is superficially attrac-tive for an analysis of the liberal peace and has encouraged research on local and grass-roots activism in peacebuilding, the so-called ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding literature. However, this framing of discourse and knowledge contributes to three major problems that are characteristic of research on the ‘local turn’: firstly, that it exaggerates the poten-tial for the local to act as a site of emancipatory resistance (Donais ; Chandler ); secondly, that its claims that local, grassroots activism offers a more representative form of peace may be unwarranted (Zanotti ); and thirdly, that it fails to correct a bias towards Northern perspectives on peace and conflict (Sabaratnam ).







contested, oppressive, even violent, except as a mirror for external aggression directed at it by international forces’ (Hughes, Öjendal, and Schierenbeck , 821).

Although the Foucauldian map of discourse and knowledge informs the frequent characterization of the local as a site of resistance (Paffenholz , 865), some argue that this characterization is a misreading of Foucault’s well-known theory of resistance, which argued that ‘resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’ (Foucault , 95). As Chandler (, 30) notes, the critical literature on liberal peace often locates resistance in the periphery, exterior to liberal order. Paffenholz also criticizes the tendency for a Foucauldian understanding of the fluidity of power to be rewritten as a binary conceptualization, in which the local is characterized as a source of ‘everyday resist-ance against the hegemonic international liberal actor and his/her dominance’ (Paffenholz , 861). Arguably, this reading of resistance in Foucault partly stems from an apparent contradiction within Foucault’s later work between the notion of resistance as produced by power, and the potential resistance of an ‘insurrection of knowledges’, the uncovering of ‘subjugated knowledges’ and counter-discourses that are located outside a hegemonic discourse.

Certainly, the identification of the local as both a locus of resistance and a potential site of emancipation frequently offers a misleading picture of contemporary conflicts. Hughes argues that an expectation of resistance from the local to a hegemonic liberal peace does not correspond to the more complex and contested reality of grassroots politics. In a study of widows seeking justice for victims of a massacre during the conflict in East Timor, she explores how activists were not automatically resistant to international structures and agencies, but instead sought allies where possible for their own struggle for justice. In doing so, they were ‘neither co-opted nor alienated by international discourses’ (Hughes , 925). This type of examination of the micro-politics of the local inevitably produces a complex picture of contestation of both international and local hierarchies, norms and discourse. As Hughes concludes:

It cannot be assumed that the local will unite in resistance—whether active or passive—to liberal intervention, and the empirical record from the colonial era onwards in fact shows many instances of efforts by different groups of actors to forge alliances with international interveners to assist them in local struggles. (Hughes , 909)

A further challenge to a Foucauldian reading of the local and the subaltern originally emerged in response to Foucault’s work on prisoners and prisons, questioning why grass-roots organizations should be considered more representative of wider society—more legitimate—than other social groups and institutions. As Zanotti argues, in a review of Richmond’s work, ‘representing grassroots civil society organizations as the “authentic” brokers of “the peoples” demands is somewhat problematic’ (Zanotti , 645). Indeed, in many fractured and conflict-prone societies the relationship between represen-tation and emancipatory positions is notoriously complex. This problem becomes clear in Richmond’s account of the Sri Lanka conflict, where he points to the liberal National Peace Council (NPC) as the type of grassroots organization that might be overlooked by liberal peace discourse and could be an actor in a more emancipatory alternative (Richmond , 114–116). Yet the NPC was funded by Western donors and was a central player in the liberal peace process of 2002–6, as well as playing a role in maintaining a peace-oriented stance during the subsequent counterinsurgency. Arguably, the denunciation of liberal peacebuilding organizations by nationalist media as ‘terrorist-sympathizing’ organizations was a more representative view among a large part of the Sinhalese population than the external construction of such groups as courageous peace activists (Walton ). In truth, neither the liberal peace nor its emancipatory shadow finds it easy to achieve dialogue with avowedly illiberal local actors. Critical thinking on the local offers little space for the discursive practice of the ‘illiberal subaltern’. However, political organizations in Sri Lanka, such as the Janathā Vimukthi Peramun a (JVP), a group that combined an avowed commitment to Marxism-Leninism with extreme nationalist positions, offered a genuine representation of some local Sinhalese nationalist attitudes and beliefs, but had no role to play in the Norwegian-led peace process of 2002–6. The inability of peace-makers to acknowledge and engage with what Rampton calls the ‘hegemonic potency of Sinhala nationalism’ (Rampton , 246) at least partly explains the breakdown in the Sri Lankan peace process and the turn to a brutal counterinsurgency in 2007.

Finally, the characterization of a dominant liberal discourse encountering a resistant, emancipatory local has the unexpected side effect of reasserting the binary Othering that forms the basis of much post-colonial critique (Sabaratnam ). Peripheral voices





Critical writing on the ‘local turn’ has largely excluded the role of elite politics and the state apparatus from its analysis (Chandler , 21; Hughes , 862; Paffenholz , 866). In this move we also see the influence of Foucault, who famously seeks to ‘cut off the King’s head’, to find a ‘political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty’ (Foucault , 121). Foucault advised against the investigation of the ‘juridical edifice of sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which accompany them’ (Foucault , 102) in favour of examining power that flows throughout society (Mills , 34). Foucault argues that ‘rather than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high, we should be trying to discover how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially consti-tuted as subjects’ (Foucault , 28). Foucault does not deny the importance of the state, but he seeks to understand the effects of power, rather than its source, looking at its ‘external face, at the point where it relates directly and immediately to … its object’ (Foucault , 28). This offered a productive shift away from the notion of ‘states as the anthropomorphised agents of power’ (Neal , 165), but has since been a major avenue of critique of Foucault. For Walzer,

Foucault seems to disbelieve in principle in the existence of a dictator or party or a state that shapes the character of disciplinary institutions. He is focused instead on what he thinks of as the ‘micro-fascism’ of everyday life and has little to say about authoritarian or totalitarian poli-tics—that is, about the forms of discipline that are most specific to his own lifetime. (Walzer , 63)

Of course, Foucault is explicit about this shift in focus, arguing that he is doing ‘precisely the opposite of what Hobbes was trying to do in Leviathan’ (Foucault , 28), focusing not on sovereignty, on the ‘central soul’ of Leviathan, but on ‘the multiple peripheral bodies, the bodies that are constituted as subjects by power-effects’ (Foucault , 29). As Neal (, 163) puts it, ‘Power is taken away from the Hobbesian sovereign’. This outcome stems from Foucault’s shift away from a homogeneous, binary concept of power, marked by ‘the domination of one individual over others, of one group over others’ (Foucault , 29). This familiar Foucauldian understanding of power has been influential in studies of peacebuilding interventions, enabling us to see the effects of ‘power at its extremities’ (Foucault , 96; 2003, 28). Through the use of Foucault’s concept of governmentality rather than a focus on sovereign power we can gain insights into the technologies of power as effected through multiple agents in complex peace-building missions (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite ; Zanotti ; Gabay and Death ).

However, this understanding of power leaves little space for the agency of the state, and critical writing on liberal peace has also too often overlooked the role of the sovereign state (exceptions include Bliesemann de Guevara ; Heathershaw and Schatz, ). Yet what Fisher () terms ‘activist regimes’—states with their own agendas and policy responses to internal conflicts—take constant measures to construct, maintain and control hegemonic discourses both through their own production of knowledge and narrative, and through their repression of alternative voices. One alternative reading of Foucault does reintroduce sovereign power into the liberal order, alongside governmentality and disciplinary power, but locates it exclusively among Western states. Jabri argues that liberal peace forms part of a ‘matrix of war’ (‘a complex array of interconnected practices that include the use of military force, policing operations, and statebuilding institutionalising measures geared at the control of populations’ (Jabri , 52); this ‘matrix of war … is expressive of sovereign power revealed through disciplinary and governmentalising practices’ (Jabri , 54). This reworking of Foucault rescues the notion of sovereign power, only to relocate it exclusively in centres of power in the West.

It is not necessary to deny the messy nature of the post-conflict state, its blurred boundaries with society, and its reliance on multiple disciplinary technologies, both formal and informal, to conclude that the significance of the sovereign state has been overlooked in recent research on civil wars. Joseph () has argued that Foucauldian concepts of governmentality are difficult to scale up to the global, since many states continue to be characterized by a predominance of ‘sovereign power’, the power ‘to take life and to let live’. In situations of civil war, states continue to have powerful effects on discourse and knowledge production through sovereign power, as state and military officials resort to physical violence to control information gathering and reporting. At least 19 journalists were murdered in Sri Lanka between 1999 and 2015 because of their reporting, the majority of them killed by state agents during the 2006–9 counterinsurgency campaign (http://www.cpj.org (​http:​/​​/​www.cpj.org​)). Most independent journalists fled Rwanda in the 2000s, as the state imposed increasing constraints on discursive chal-lenges to its monopoly of the post-conflict narrative. In Russia, the state has introduced extensive controls on reporting and media since the 1990s. In particular, journalists reporting the war in Chechnya faced the threat of physical attack and murder; Anna Politkovskaya, a reporter for Novaya gazeta, was shot dead in Moscow in 2006. In Turkey at least 25 journalists have been killed since 1992; state officials are suspected of involvement in 44% of these deaths (http://www.cpj.org (​http:​/​​/​www.cpj.org​)).

This capacity to take life is combined with the ability to impose physical restrictions on access to territory. Sovereign power is able to impose significant constraints on movement across a state’s territory, thereby restricting the collection and distribution of information and knowledge about armed conflict (see Fisher in this issue). In situations of ongoing con-flict, restrictions on reporting and dissemination of knowledge become particularly acute. A photojournalist who was shot and injured by Turkish security forces in May 2016, while covering the conflict with the PKK, told the Guardian newspaper: ‘The government con-trols the narrative, barring a large part of the country from knowing what is going on’ (Letsch ). The Turkish state has strictly controlled access to zones of conflict in the south-east of the country, where more than 70 ‘security zones’ marked by curfews and control of movement were set up after fighting resumed in 2015 (RSF ). In Sri Lanka, most areas of military activity were out of bounds to journalists in 2006–9, as the military sought to pursue a counterinsurgency operation without fear of observers report-ing war crimes and human rights abuses. In Rwanda, President Kagame was explicit about his approach to conflict reporting, boasting that, ‘We used communication and infor-mation warfare better than anyone. We have found a new way of doing things’ (Reyntjens , 26). The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was adept at the ‘closure of the conflict scene’ (Reyntjens, , 26), developing a strategy to ‘ban outsiders from the battle zone; delay and frustrate their movements; deny any “rumour” of military excesses; and withhold information’ (Pottier , 58, cited in Reyntjens , 27). Such closure of con-flict zones became standard practice for regimes that wanted to control the production of knowledge. In relation to the Second Chechen War, Russell notes that, ‘Unlike the first war, with a few brave exceptions, neither Russian nor Western media were allowed free access to the conflict zone’ (Russell , 109). Pohl writes that during this period ‘the entire republic of Chechnya … turned into a special off-limits zone, a place where disappear-ances, torture, and violent death are commonplace experiences’ (Pohl , 30).





The third limitation of Foucauldian frameworks of discourse and knowledge is the way in which discourses are represented as monolithic entities that obscure discursive contesta-tion. Foucault’s accounts of historical discourses focus on the ‘radical breaks, ruptures and discontinuities between one period and another’ (Hall ), but struggle to conceptualize the existence of parallel or overlapping discourses, which contest hegemony over a broader discursive field. Discursive rupture and discontinuity are understood diachroni-cally, in which ‘[t]races of past discourses remain embedded in more recent discourses’ (Hall , 166) but Foucauldian discourse analysis seldom conceives of multiple dis-courses in contestation in the same historical period. In a classic Foucauldian analysis of the post-Cold War human rights regime, for example, Manokha identifies a historical dis-continuity, or rupture, between the contested concept of human rights in the Cold War period, and the subsequent two decades, when human rights came to constitute a domi-nant discourse (Manokha , 68). However, this understanding of discourse overlooks the always contested nature of human rights in the present, leaving us with a mapping of human rights discourse that appears monolithic and unchallenged (Manokha ).

The characterization of liberal peace as a dominant, unitary discourse produces an inevitable occlusion of alternative discourses of peace and conflict. The current inter-national system is characterized not only by disputes within the liberal order—an intra-discursive competition over the nature of the liberal peace—but also by inter-discursive ideological challenges, in which alternative discourses challenge the theoretical assumptions, norms and practices of liberal peacebuilding. Post-Foucauldian discourse theories offer a potentially more productive framework through which contestation comes into view. Jørgensen and Phillips argue that contemporary discourse theories ‘diverge from Foucault’s tendency to identify only one knowledge regime in each historical period; instead, they operate with a more conflictual picture in which different discourses exist side by side or struggle for the right to define truth’ (Jørgensen and Phillips , 13). The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe and the Critical Discourse Analysis pioneered by Fairclough both move beyond Foucault’s often monolithic view of discourse to explore a much more contested topography. Rear concurs that ‘while Foucault tended to identify one dominant discourse or knowledge regime in a historical period, [Laclau and Mouffe] present a more conflictual picture in which different discourses exist side by side or struggle for the right to define truth’ (Rear , 17).

Laclau and Mouffe’s work () relies heavily on Gramsci’s understanding of hege-mony, which they reinterpret using the concept of discourse. In attempting to achieve a sustainable hegemony in society, social actors engage in competition over the meaning of key signs; as a consequence, discourses are in constant flux, threatened by other rising discourses which offer their own meaning and interpretation of events. Each dis-course seeks closure—a final fixing of meaning for key ‘floating signifiers’, such as ‘democracy’, ‘conflict’ or ‘peace’—but any final fixity of meaning is impossible, as other discourses also compete to define these polysemic signs in accordance with a wider discourse (Laclau and Mouffe , 91ff.). Discourse is ‘an attempt to stop the sliding of the signs in relation to one another and hence to create a unified system of meaning’ (Jørgensen and Phillips , 27). It attempts to achieve closure by excluding alternative meanings and through what Laclau and Mouffe term ‘articulation’, or the ‘con-struction of nodal points that partially fix meaning’ (Laclau and Mouffe , 100). The impossibility of ‘closure’ of a particular discourse produces a constant struggle over the meanings of signs, and thus over which discourses are hegemonic in society.

This map of discourses as forever competing, seeking but failing to achieve a totaliza-tion of meaning and identity, offers a more productive framework for the study of the dis-courses of contemporary conflict than a Foucauldian genealogy. It opens the analytical vision to include a range of discourses that challenge both the liberal peace and its critics. In a Laclauan discourse, subjugated or marginalized knowledge and subaltern actors form part of a much wider ‘discursive field’, within which they may contribute to competing discourses, offering alternative visions of local and international order. Jørgensen and Phillips make a useful analytic distinction between the ‘field of discursiv-ity’—all the possible meanings of ‘floating signifiers’—and the ‘order of discourse’—‘a limited range of discourses which struggle in the same terrain’ (Jørgensen and Phillips ). It is this ‘order of discourse’—the range of alternative constructions of concepts such as war and peace—that is too often overlooked in Foucauldian discourse theory.

Critical thinking on peacebuilding has prioritized the quest for a more pluralist under-standing of peace, asserting that liberalism’s definitions of peace have often been exclu-sive and totalizing. Kühn argues that peace is ‘open for ideational competition and [needs] further interrogation by intellectuals and researchers’, but pre-empts this competition by calling for ‘a re-injection of the emancipatory content peace might have’ (Kühn , 397– 398). The critical search for pluralism baulks at a peace that is hierarchical, non-emancipa-tory or oppressive. Richmond, for example, asserts that:

The attempt to include the Taliban in a peace process in Afghanistan cannot be emancipatory or empathetic if gender issues are not addressed or any ‘high peace council’ results in an oppressive framework for other groups, unable to provide them with both rights or needs. (Richmond , 63)

In this way, the search for pluralistic meanings is limited to an alternative interpretation of ‘peace’ as ‘emancipatory’ but does not open up ‘peace’ to a dialogue across Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘discursive field’, referencing the entire panoply of meanings that peace might contain.

A genuine pluralism of meanings of peace requires an understanding of alternative dis-courses, their origins, dynamics and roots in diverse political, cultural and social orders. There are many such discourses, in different cultural, geographic and historical contexts. Islamist conceptualizations of order seek to create forms of pan-Islamic political structures (Tadjbakhsh ); anti-capitalist ideas promoted by the Latin American group of leftist states, ALBA, constitute an alternative discourse to the dominant ideas of neo-liberal glo-balization (Al Attar and Miller ); an influential strand in Chinese intellectual debate construes international order as a Sino-centric, neo-Confucian order (Callahan ), while Russian constructions of peace and stability are often informed by hierarchical, authoritarian views of order (Heathershaw ).

Russia’s articulation of particular meanings of peace and conflict—asserted in response to conflicts in Chechnya, Ukraine and Syria—has contributed to an increasingly influential discourse of ‘authoritarian’ or ‘illiberal’ peace. In this discourse, peace is understood as hierarchically informed order, with narrowly defined legitimate agency, constraining who has the moral right to speak and act in situations of conflict (Lewis ; ). The state—and more specifically the sovereign leader within the state—is empowered to take decisions for the good of the wider community: the goal is not emancipation for the marginalized and the peripheral, but protection for the core, the self-identified majority of an identitarian political community. This authoritarian peace can be under-stood as a contemporary reworking of Carl Schmitt’s conceptualization of stable political order, characterized as ‘the idea that the risk of irresolvable political conflict can be elimi-nated by putting in place stable hierarchical relations that suppress disagreement’ (Bränn-ström , 30). A Schmittian peace relies on two famous principles in Schmitt’s thought. Firstly, contra Foucault, the Schmittian discourse defines the sovereign leader as the only actor enjoying the right to articulate a decisive political position (Schmitt ). It is the sovereign state, and not a ‘previously determined general norm’ or ‘the judgement of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party’ (Schmitt , 27), which decides ques-tions of war and peace. Secondly, Schmitt argues for a political discourse that is founded on a distinction between friend and enemy (Schmitt , 26). This distinction is the founding decision that brings political order into being and maintains a viable political community. Rather than trying to transcend difference through inclusive, democratic poli-tics, the friend/enemy distinction asserts the necessity of drawing stark boundaries between communities in order to constitute a viable, stable political entity. Both principles pose a fundamental challenge to norms of liberal peace.

This authoritarian peace—comprising the reification of a sovereign centre and the con-struction of an internal friend/enemy divide as the constitutive basis of a system of conflict management—can be observed in recent and contemporary conflicts in Chechnya, Eastern Turkey, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Ethiopia and other conflict-affected states. In these civil conflicts, the emerging post-liberal peace is not an emancipatory or even a hybrid order, but a state-centric authoritarian political order. In each case the state seeks to define peace as the reassertion of hierarchical state authority over territory, space and resources, and it seeks to achieve this outcome not only through military means, but also through the control of alternative knowledge production about the conflict and the channelling of economic resources through loyal patronage networks and clientelist networks (Zabyelina ; Lewis ).

Significantly, the discourse of authoritarian peace is not limited to individual sovereign states but circulates among and between states, and emerges in sites of international diplomacy, in ways that increasingly challenge the global hegemony of the liberal peace. Discursive activism supporting what Piccolino () terms ‘illiberal international-ism’ can be traced back at least to the Kosovo war of 1999, but became much more sig-nificant after 2007–8, marked by the repeated interventions by Russia and China in UN Security Council debates over wars in Syria, Sudan, Sri Lanka and elsewhere. The illiberal norms that underpin the authoritarian peace can be identified in the discourses promoted in Russian and Chinese-led regional security organizations. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for example, asserts what it terms the ‘Shanghai spirit’, a normative frame-work that highlights what Beijing refers to as the ‘three evils’—terrorism, religious extre-mism and separatism (Ambrosio )—and constructs peace in terms of the sustainability of political hierarchy, social and economic stability and state control. As the international liberal order faces mounting challenges, both from authoritarian powers in the international system and from within Western liberal democracies, the alternative discourse of authoritarian peace is likely to gain increasing international legitimacy.


Conclusion: discourse, knowledge and peace

In this article I have argued that existing understandings of discourse in both the liberal peace literature and among its critics are inadequate to conceptualize contemporary inter-national relations. A critical approach—strongly influenced by Foucault—which posits a hegemonic, unitary discourse that disciplines alternative knowledges, always offered only a limited approximation of global order, even during the short-lived ‘unipolar moment’ of the early twenty-first century. Such a theoretical framework produces an unconvincing account of the emancipatory resistance present in an externally constructed ‘local’, hinders our understanding of the significance of sovereign state power, and occludes alternative discourses that seek to articulate their own meanings of key signifiers, such as ‘peace’ and ‘conflict’. Instead, I use post-Foucauldian theories of discourse to propose a more pluralist account of discourses of peacebuilding and conflict manage-ment, which opens up discussion of alternative, competing discourses including illiberal discourses of ‘authoritarian peace’.
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